



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 30 June 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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

Executive Summary: In June, there were 86 IED events within the Indo-Pacific region, consisting of 38 detonation events, 17 found/cleared events, and 31 cache events. Compared to last month, there was a 48% decrease in IED activity and a 54% drop in IED-related casualties. June events included a total of 170 devices, compared to 579 in May. For the first time in 11 months, an IED event occurred in Northeast Asia.

There were 86 IED events in the Indo-Pacific region in June 2018




Icons depict events for June 2018; heat map depicts event density from June 2017 - June 2018



June IED events



June IED events by Country




June IED Casualties



[Click on an entry to advance to the associated page.](#)

This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

June Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region



Executive Summary (Continued)

SOUTH ASIA

In South Asia, IED activity decreased from 105 events in May to 54 events in June. There was also a decrease in IED-related casualties, from 98 casualties in May to 50 casualties in June. In Bangladesh, there were 10 IED events in June (compared to six in May), and a total of two IED-related casualties (compared to seven in May) ([see pg. 9](#)). In India, there were 41 IED events (a 40% decrease from May) and 48 IED-related casualties (a 45% decrease from May) ([see pg. 10](#)). In Nepal, there was a substantial drop in IED activity (3 events in June compared to 31 in May) and no reported IED-related casualties ([see pg. 11](#)).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	40	19	0	36	95
	Year	937	391	20	1466	2814
Event Count	Month	25	11	0	18	54
	Year	444	268	17	228	957


SOUTHEAST ASIA

In Southeast Asia, IED activity decreased from 59 events in May to 31 events in June. IED-related casualties also decreased, from 95 casualties in May to 24 casualties in June. In the Philippines, there were 21 IED events in June (a 13% decrease from May) and 15 IED-related casualties (a 38% decrease from May) ([see pg. 13](#)). In Thailand, IED-related casualties increased from three to six casualties; however, IED events decreased from 20 IED events in May to 7 events in June ([see pg. 14](#)). In Indonesia, IED events dropped from 14 in May to two in June ([see pg. 14](#)), as security forces continued to disrupt militant cells ([see pg. 15](#)).


		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	12	7	0	55	74
	Year	279	535	14	706	1534
Event Count	Month	12	6	0	13	31
	Year	199	74	8	163	444

NOTE: Starting in April 2018, the APCFC Monthly IED report will include both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.


PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months



Past Year IED events by Country



Past Year Device Count by Country




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	53	26	0	91	170
	Year	1219	926	35	2172	4352
Event Count	Month	38	17	0	31	86
	Year	646	342	26	392	1406


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: IED Spike in Jammu and Kashmir

On 28 MAY, the first IED since 2016 detonated in southern Jammu and Kashmir. In comparison, in the past year, there has been a marked increase in the volume of IED activity in northern Jammu and Kashmir, though it currently remains sporadic and most events are interdictions that occur at the border. Though Jaish-e Mohammed (JeM) claimed responsibility for the May 2018 attack, Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) released a video of a described commander building an IED on the same day, fueling speculation the two incidents are associated. The attack and video sparked concerns among Indian security forces that Jammu and Kashmir militants may be increasing their use of IEDs; a string of five additional IED events in the first few weeks of June seemed to validate these concerns.

Officials identified the LeT commander featured in the online video as Umar Hanzalla. The video shows him building IEDs using metal milk cans, metal utensils, electric detonators, and an unidentified gray explosive powder. It is quite likely that Hanzalla was responsible for some of the recent IED events and it is probable that he possesses a familiarity with radio-controlled devices. According to reporting, Hanzalla uses pressure cookers, similar to the unclaimed IED found in Awantipora on 12 JUN, which used urea as a main charge. Of note, militants in Jammu and Kashmir typically claim responsibility for IED attacks. Though there was some speculation that Hanzalla created the 28 MAY device, the increased volume of attacks in the following weeks opens the possibility that multiple IED makers were involved, especially since JeM claimed responsibility for the recent roadside IED activity in southern Jammu and Kashmir. Conversely, LeT has yet to claim responsibility for any IED attacks and has only claimed responsibility for its fidayeen operations. Groups in the region have overlapping memberships and generally collaborate, so it remains possible that Hanzalla has broader involvement in the region's increased IED activity beyond just one group.

Despite the ambiguity around the recent spike of IED activity in Jammu and Kashmir, it is clear that the main militant groups in the region are investing in their IED capabilities as the relations between Pakistan and India continue to deteriorate. Though it is not certain whether the recent volume will maintain, the online promotion of bomb-makers suggests that Kashmiri militants may resume the regular use of IEDs for the first time since 2010.



28 MAY video showing LeT commander Umar Hanzalla building an IED

Sources: Times Now News (5/28/18) Greater Kashmir (5/29/17) Daily Hunt (6/12/18)

Special Assessment: Bangladesh's Counterterrorism Success

Many countries in the Indo-Pacific region are grappling with the threats posed by insurgencies, extremism, and internal political turmoil. Perhaps most concerning, is the growth and expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has prompted the further advancement of Islamic extremism and associated terroristic activities throughout the region. Responses to the Islamist threat by governments in the Indo-Pacific have been disparate and yielded varied results. However, Bangladesh's counter-terrorism efforts are worthy of examination, particularly due to the nation's notable successes in reducing terrorist networks.


Prior to pro-ISIS, Neo-Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB) attackers storming Dhaka's Holey Artisan Bakery in July 2016, Islamism had established a strong foothold in Bangladesh. Years of political turmoil and corresponding violence facilitated the emergence of multiple extremist organizations, including the pro-Pakistan Jamaat-e Islami/Islami Chhatra Shibir (Jel/ICS), al-Qa'ida-aligned Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT, Ansar al-Islam), and JMB. In the last two years, Bangladesh has emerged as a model for reacting to and countering violent extremist activity. Beginning with the nation's actions after the Holey Artisan Bakery, its focused counter-terrorism operations have resulted in the degradation of militant organizations and a significant reduction in IED events.



Conservative activists protesting against secularists and liberal bloggers

Beginning in 2013, al-Qa'ida-aligned ABT conducted deadly attacks targeting liberal writers and activists. The ABT adopted particularly gruesome methods, which included using bladed weapons to hack their victims to death. After the release of a "hit list" of 84 liberal bloggers, atheists, and secularists, militants began systematically murdering these individuals; extremists have killed at least 40 liberal bloggers to date. Notable among those killed was Bangladeshi-American writer Avjit Roy, who militants hacked to death while riding in a tuk-tuk with his wife in February 2015. More recently on 11 JUN, attackers gunned down the secularist publisher and writer Shahjahan Bachchu outside a pharmacy. Interestingly, the attack appeared to show a blend of both ABT and JMB TTPs (targeting resembled ABT, while attack planning and methodology resembled JMB/Neo-JMB). In late June, Bangladeshi counter-terrorism experts confirmed via CCTV footage that JMB militants were the likely culprits.

As ISIS began to promote its ideology and extremist narratives via multiple methods (e.g. social media, online and paper publications, etc.), the organization encouraged militants that could not travel to the Middle East to conduct attacks in their native countries. There is a strong likelihood that pro-ISIS elements in Bangladesh embraced this directive. There are numerous examples of ISIS-inspired militants conducting high-profile attacks to include the murder of aid worker Cesare Tavella in September 2015 and the Ashura Procession attack in October 2015. Additionally, senior JMB militants planned and executed the attack at the Holey Artisan Bakery in Gulshan, Dhaka. This event demonstrated a complexity and viciousness heretofore unseen in Bangladesh. The attack resulted in 23 (mainly foreign) civilians and two police officers killed, and a further 50 people wounded. The brutality of the attack shocked the country, forcing the security architecture to re-examine the terrorism issue.



Neo-JMB leaders and attack planners (Left to Right): Tamim Chowdhury (d. AUG 2016), Nurul Islam Marjan (d. JAN 2017), Sohel Mahfuz (detained JUL 2017)

Following the bakery incident, ISIS aspirants attacked police protecting the Eid festival in Sholakia, which resulted in three killed and 14 wounded. These events served to galvanize security forces, which resulted in an increase in policing and investigative work. Based on the growing evidence from these events, the National Police Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) began the systematic information collection and targeting of members of the ISIS-inspired Neo-JMB.

In 2016-2017, the RAB, police, and specialized counter-terrorism units conducted over 30 raids, reportedly neutralized 125 suspected Islamists, and detained over 2,100 suspected militants. This included the capturing or killing of almost all the senior leaders of Neo-JMB, including the alleged emir of Bangladesh, Tamim Chowdhury, and Gulshan attack facilitator, Niloy. Security forces also cracked down on Jel/ICS and other organizations in anti-militancy drives, despite political opponents claiming that the government is using the drives as an excuse to suppress political opposition. However, historical precedents demonstrate that much of the violence that typically plagues Bangladesh surrounds elections thus, it is logical that the government would adopt a more aggres-

Special Assessment: Bangladesh's Counterterrorism Success



Suicide belts recovered during raids against Neo-JMB hideouts in 2016-2017

sive stance against violent political groups and militant organizations. The national elections scheduled for late 2018 will likely witness further actions undertaken by counter-terrorism forces to maintain security.

As Bangladeshi security forces expanded their investigations and raids on Neo-JMB hideouts, they discovered alarming new IED TTP developments, which included the use of suicide devices. For instance, in December 2016, a female militant detonated a suicide belt at the point of capture. Subsequent suicide IED events in March 2017 led to a coordinated response by security forces with a series of named raids and operations against militant cells. In March and April 2017 alone, there were seven named operations, many of which concluded with the detonation or recovery of PBIEDs. A total of 30 PBIED events occurred between March 2017 and January 2018, with over half resulting in device detonations. Of note, militant families used PBIEDs in a defensive manner, often detonating devices to kill all family members to prevent capture and interrogation.

The named operations also revealed an increase in the militants' tactical proficiency. In the 83-hour long "Operation Twilight" in March 2017, two Neo-JMB militants conducted a semi-successful counter-raid against RAB forces, resulting in the death of the RAB Intelligence Wing Director, Lt. Col. Abul Kalam Azad. Security forces discovered that the militants were part of an IED cell in Borohat, which conducted the counter-attack as an attempt to free besieged militants. Such actions are concerning, as previously, the tactic of targeting first responders was not a means employed by Bangladeshi militants. In a period of approximately two-years, militants significantly advanced their tactics, evolving from the use of simple, impact-detonated thrown devices to producing their own HME, to the employment of suicide devices, and the use of increasingly daring tactics to target civilians and security forces.

Bangladesh's proactive stance involved not only kinetic, but also non-kinetic action. For instance, Bangladesh established new anti-terrorism units at the national and local levels to improve policing and to prevent the growth of terrorist cells. Additionally, they implemented reforms to the madrasa system, aimed at reducing exposure to the concepts of militant jihad. Bangladesh's emphasis on the prosecution of war crimes and a stern commitment to the value of secular government supported a whole of government response to potential terrorist threats. Moreover, the willingness to assess internal vulnerabilities, such as identifying issues with the legal system or gaps in technology and frameworks needed to contend with developing threats, signals the nation's commitment to reducing the threat of terrorism.





Bangladeshi Security Forces conducting clearing operations following 'Operation Twilight'

By continuing to take an aggressive stance towards combating terrorism and militancy, and by promoting stability and accountability, Bangladesh has shown itself to be willing to address the threats of terrorism. Continued vigilance and the development of counter-terrorism capabilities are key to preventing further attacks, particularly as Neo-JMB's power and influence wane. The increased stability is nonetheless tenuous, as a militant power vacuum, coupled with desperation and disaffection, may draw radicals back into pro-AQ elements, such as ABT, or into violent political causes, such as Jel/ICS. Additionally, other organizations, despite differences in ideology, may incorporate the operational knowledge and experience of Neo-JMB to increase their operational effectiveness.

Sources: SATP 2016 SATP 2017 SATP 2018 CNN (2/28/13) Reuters (7/6/16) VOA (3/1/17) Reuters (3/17/17) CNN (3/24/17) Daily Star (7/9/17) Daily Star (6/12/18) Diplomat (7/6/17) Daily Star (6/19/18)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Abhay Devdas Nayak		
ALIAS: Lodda, Abhay, Azad AGE: 34 AREA OF OPERATION: Bengaluru and Bastar, India AFFILIATIONS: Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M, Naxalite), Maoist organizations worldwide		
<p>Abhay Devdas Nayak is a Bengaluru-based member of the CPI-M, serving as the group's spokesperson and as a member of a propaganda cell. Nayak is long-time member of the group, having joined in 2005. He holds a Bachelor's degree in business from Bangalore University and a Masters in Psychology from Annamalai University. Dubbed an "urban Maoist" by Indian security forces, his education and capabilities set him apart as a forward-thinking leader in the group.</p> <p>Nayak's studies in stock trading, website design, and digital marketing likely influenced his placement in the propaganda wing and his subsequent appointment as a Maoist spokesperson. His activity on social media platforms includes distributing Maoist propaganda and identifying and recruiting youth through interactions with anti-national and anti-police groups. These recruitment techniques resemble those used by ISIS in India and are unusual for a group typically not recognized as embracing the use of technology.</p> <p>Nayak also engaged in fundraising through both a microfinance front company he started in 2008 and by engaging with sympathizers around the world. In 2017, he allegedly travelled to at least 15 countries to garner funds and support for the CPI-M. He likely engaged with fellow Maoists, as several of the countries he visited have rebel organizations that are part of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Party and Organizations in South Asia.</p> <p>Chhattisgarh police detained Nayak on 31 MAY for violating the Criminal Conspiracy Act, Explosives Substances Act, and parts of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). He has been implicated in a 2013 IED attack when security forces discovered CPI-M leaflets issued in the name of "Abhay" at the site in Bastar, India. It is unclear what effects Nayak's arrest will have on CPI-M recruitment efforts. However, if the Indian government continues to aggressively pursue CPI-M members under the UAPA legal authorities, it will likely degrade the organization's ability to effectively recruit new members and will potentially hinder future IED operations.</p>		
Sources: Times of India (6/12/18) Counter Currents (6/18/18) Hindustan Times (6/12/18) Financial Express (6/13/18) Indian Express (6/13/18) Times of India (6/13/18) Business Standard (6/12/18)		
VEO: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)		
AREA OF OPERATIONS: Mindanao, Philippines LEADER: Esmael Abdulmalik (alias Ismael Abubakar, Bongos) AFFILIATIONS: ISIS-P, Maute Group, Abu Sayyaf Group		
<p>The BIFF is a Muslim separatist group, aligned to the Salafi Jihadism movement, operating primarily within the Philippine southern island of Mindanao. Possessing an estimated cadre of 300 members and an armory of conventional weapons and improvised explosive devices, the group seeks to establish a fully independent Muslim state for the Filipino Muslim minority, known as the Moro people. BIFF militants engage in opportunistic and coordinated attacks, primarily targeting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with little regard for civilian safety.</p> <p>Established in 2010 by Ameril Umbra Kato, the BIFF sought to disrupt the peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Following Esmael Abdulmalik's assumption of leadership in 2015, the BIFF has slowly re-structured into a decentralized organization.</p> <p>Prior to the siege on Marawi City, BIFF leadership openly espoused ISIS ideology, leading to an unknown number of the BIFF members fighting and providing logistical support during the siege to the Maute Group, Abu Sayyaf, and foreign militants. Since the fall of Marawi City, the BIFF has emerged as a primary concern for the AFP and the focus of their operations in Mindanao. The BIFF's most recent large-scale, coordinated attack occurred on 21 JUN, when 100 militants armed with small arms and IEDs attacked a government outpost. After the attack, 30 BIFF members took over a nearby school and held 12 civilian hostages as human shields; it is unknown if any hostages were wounded, but police reported the situation was resolved the following morning.</p> <p>The BIFF will likely continue to target government assets with guerrilla warfare tactics and remain an attractive VEO for those who maintain a desire to see a fully-independent Islamic state established in the southern Philippines. This is particularly true for those living in the most impoverished areas of Mindanao, who may feel disenfranchised and excluded from the potential benefits resultant from a political settlement with the government.</p>		
Sources: Reuters (3/11/17) Asia Times (10/22/17) Geopolitical Monitor (2/12/18) CTC (11/1/13) Rappler (6/21/17)		

South Asia: June Significant Activity

Bangladesh

In June, Bangladeshi authorities announced that the government would purchase modern telecommunications surveillance equipment to collect evidence against suspected criminals or militants to aid in prosecution. The National Telecommunication Monitoring Centre (NTMC) has been assisting law enforcement agencies since 2014 by conducting lawful intercept actions of network data and in some cases, the content of communications. **Daily Star (6/13/18)**

Bangladesh continued its anti-drug law enforcement campaign in June, with the total number of killed rising to over 160. The majority of the deaths were due to shootouts with law enforcement personnel, though feuds between drug gangs and factions also contributed to some of the deaths. Authorities have detained approximately 20,000 others for suspected drug crimes. Yaba, a mixture of methamphetamine and caffeine, remains one of the most prolific drugs in Bangladesh and Thailand, and authorities have expressed concerns that Rohingya refugees may have brought Yaba production and distribution networks into Bangladesh from Burma. **Diplomat (6/4/18) Daily Star (6/19/18) Trend News (6/25/18)**

India

In June, following May's contentious elections in West Bengal, the two primary parties in the area, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) and the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), blamed each other for violence and vote tampering. The TMC claims that it has worked effectively towards the betterment of the villages in West Bengal and has completed developmental work across the state. However, the incidents of violence recorded and circulated on social media during the filing of nominations for the elections in rural areas of the state claim to prove that the party has done little in terms of governance apart from engaging in propaganda. In response to these claims, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee (TMC member), stated that the BJP was conspiring with other local groups to encourage sectarian violence, to attack the TMC, and to manipulate voting machines. **The Wire (6/10/18) Times News Now (6/21/18)**

On 11 JUN, a recently apprehended Srinagar-based terrorist reportedly revealed a plot to boost the insurgency in Kashmir by anti-India terror groups, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizbul Mujahideen. The detained suspect, identified as Ashiq Baba, was working directly for JeM. During his interrogation with the National Investigation Agency (NIA), Baba claimed to have travelled to Pakistan on various occasions between 2015 and 2017. Baba, who claimed to have worked closely with JeM's second-in-command, Abdul Rauf and Maulana Mufti Asghar, said JeM is working in "close coordination with Lashkar and Hizbul" to target Indian forces. **Latest LY (6/11/18)**

On 6 JUN, LeT claimed responsibility for the attack on the Hajin Army Camp in Jammu and Kashmir's Bandipora district. Abdullah Ghaznavi, spokesman for LeT, said LeT carried out the *fidayeen* attack at the Rashtriya Rifles camp in Hajin, in which three soldiers died. During the attack, militants fired grenades and used automatic weapons. On 17 JUN, Union Home Minister, Rajnath Singh, said that operations against terrorists would resume, as the Indian government has decided not to extend the Suspension of Operations (SoO) in Jammu and Kashmir. **The Hindu (6/18/18) The Print (6/18/18) First Post (6/18/18)**


Reporting in June indicates that militants might be planning to attack the Hindu pilgrims that flood Amarnath each year for the *Amarnath Yatra*. Amarnath Cave is a Hindu shrine located in Jammu and Kashmir. The shrine is one of the holiest shrines in Hinduism. Hundreds of thousands of Hindu devotees make an annual pilgrimage to the Amarnath Cave across challenging mountainous terrain every year. In July 2017, terrorists attacked eight pilgrims on a bus en route to the shrine. Hence, all vehicles moving towards the base camps will be fitted with GPS-enabled RFID stickers. The RF tags will help security agencies track any bus/taxi that goes beyond specified/approved routes. **Times of India (6/20/18) Times Now News (6/22/18)**

In late June, media reported that Maoist/Naxalites are threatening people in Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district and have apparently asked them to send one member from each family to join them. Over the past few months, officials have reported several clashes between the security forces and the Naxals. As a means of increasing their troop strength, the Naxals are now reportedly forcing villagers to join them. Some villagers report death threats from Naxals who refuse to provide a family member. Police, however, have denied any forced conscription of locals. **Business Standard (6/25/18) Times Now News (6/25/18) Financial Express (6/25/18)**

Maldives

On 7 JUN, Maldivian authorities announced that they would conduct presidential elections on 23 SEP, though moves by the current administration have aimed to prevent opposition candidates from running. Charges raised against many senior leaders in the opposition Maldivian Democratic Party will effectively prevent their running, though the international community remains skeptical that the accusations are legitimate. The government has exiled other potential candidates to include former president Mohamed Nasheed. **Washington Post (6/8/18) Reuters (6/9/18)**

Bangladesh: June IED Events



There were five IED detonation events, two found and cleared events, and three IED cache events.

On 11 JUN, four suspected Ansar al-Islam extremists detonated two IEDs and murdered a liberal writer and activist in Kakaldi, Sirajdikhan, Munshiganj, Dhaka. Security forces recovered an additional IED after the attack. The target, Shahjahan Bachchu, died during the attack after militants shot him in the chest. **Daily Star (6/13/18) Dhaka Tribune (6/11/18) UNB (6/13/18)**

On 21 JUN, suspected Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal activists detonated four to five IEDs against a police patrol van in Sharankhola, Bagerhat, Khulna; two police injured and two suspects detained. Police recovered five IEDs from the detained suspects. **UNB (6/21/18)**


On 24 JUN, security forces recovered an IED cache from a suspected JMB militant in Keaw Pashim Khanda, Sreepur, Gazipur, Dhaka. The cache contained four IEDs and three pistols. **Dhaka Tribune (6/25/18)**

On 29 JUN, police recovered an IED cache following a gunfight with a local gang as they attempted to free their detained accomplice in Jhikorgachha, Jessore, Khulna. The cache contained five IEDs, one gun, and one bullet. **Daily Star (7/1/18)**

In June, the number of IED events remained constant from the previous month. The 11 JUN attack against a liberal writer was perhaps the most significant event in June as it marks the potential shift of militant organizations back to attacking liberal bloggers/writers/activists (this was the first liberal blogger attack since 2016). As Neo-JMB's power wanes, it is quite likely that attacks conducted by less active militant organizations will increase (see **Special Assessment**).


It is highly likely IED activity will increase in the second half of the year due to upcoming national elections. Political violence is one of the primary drivers for IED activity in Bangladesh, and attacks against political opponents are commonplace. In previous elections, there was widespread violence, primarily instigated by militant organizations aligned to the Bangladesh National Party.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	12	6	0	13	31
	Year	51	15	1	199	266
Event Count	Month	5	2	0	3	10
	Year	25	8	1	46	80



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: June IED Events



There were 19 IED detonation events, seven IED found and cleared events, and 15 IED cache events.

On 17 JUN, Members of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K) and United Liberation Front of Assam – Independent (ULFA-I) executed a complex IED attack against an Assam Rifles patrol. The insurgents detonated an IED and followed with small arms fire, killing at least two security forces and injuring four others. **News Click (6/20/18) New Indian Express (6/17/18)**

On 17 JUN, during an Eid-ul-Fitr (end of Ramadan) celebration at Mansabal Park in Jammu and Kashmir, an IED emplaced in a dustbin detonated near civilians, injuring at least five people. Officials initially thought the detonation was a firework; however, later reporting described the device as composed of a bottle, adhesive tape, a fuse, a wick, and a nitrate mixture. **Greater Kashmir (6/17/18) Greater Kashmir (6/21/18) Business Standard (6/21/18)**

On 26 JUN, the CPI-M detonated an IED and engaged security forces with small arms fire near Tumera, on the border between Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, which resulted in at least four killed and 10 injured. Militants emplaced the IED along the road and detonated it as the patrol passed. **Hindu (6/26/18) NDTV (6/27/18) Zee News (6/27/18)**


Overall IED activity in the month of June decreased from the previous month primarily due to the conclusion of West Bengal elections (see **May 2018 India page**). Despite the potential increase of IED events during Ramadan, activity in Jammu and Kashmir was relatively stable.

The Northeast region had fewer IED events in June; however, an attack conducted by a joint contingent of ULFA-I and NSCN-K insurgents was unusual. Cooperation between groups is rare; however, recent media reports indicate that the NSCN-K could absorb the ULFA-I. As this type of operational collaboration has not yet been observed, it is possible that the combined 17 JUN attack was opportunistic. If these two groups combine, they would have an operational area that runs from Assam to Manipur and across the border into Burma. Additionally, the merger of the two organizations could potentially increase their operational and logistical capabilities.


IED activity in the Red Corridor continued to decline in June, most likely due to the security forces' successes in reacting to Maoist attacks, seeking out Maoist strongholds, and patrolling in remote regions. IED attacks targeting road and infrastructure construction have also dropped, potentially due to degraded Maoist capabilities. The overall strength of the Maoist appears to be in a period of decline, which is apparent in their recent strong-arm recruiting techniques and sparse attacks in the region.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	25	11	0	23	59
	Year	685	212	4	1248	2152
Event Count	Month	19	7	0	15	41
	Year	251	109	8	164	532


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: June IED Events



There was one IED detonation event and two IED found and cleared events.


On 12 JUN, three socket bombs detonated at the Arun III Hydropower Plant office in Khandbari, Sankhuwasabha, Koshi; no casualties reported. This is the second attack on the power plant office this year. **Nepal Monitor (6/13/18)**

On 13 JUN, Nepal Army EOD cleared an IED from the roof of the car of Romnath Oli, the mayor of Damak. Oli was returning home from work when he noticed the IED in a box on the roof of his vehicle. This is the third event targeting local politicians in the area this year. **Kathmandu Post (6/14/18) Nepal Monitor (6/14/18)**

On 20 JUN, Nepal Army EOD cleared an IED contained in a drink can at the Kanchanjangha Construction Company office in Pakhribas, Dhankuta, Koshi. Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) activists likely planted the device after threatening action against the company over alleged negligence in a road construction project. **Setopati (6/20/18)**

IED activity dropped sharply in June, with three events targeting infrastructure projects or elected officials. Thus far in 2018, 10 reported events targeted government officials or offices and a further 11 events targeted infrastructure or related projects. In June, two out of the three events targeted infrastructure project offices: the Arun III Hydropower Plant and the Kanchanjangha Construction Company. Militants previously attacked the Arun III Hydropower Plant office in April, shortly before Indian Prime Minister Modi made an official to Kathmandu. This attack was likely an affront to India's investment in Nepal's infrastructure development. Attacking infrastructure and development projects is a common practice by militant organizations throughout the Indo-Pacific region, as such actions highlight the inability of a government to provide security and essential services.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	3	2	0	0	5
	Year	201	164	12	19	396
Event Count	Month	1	2	0	0	3
	Year	168	151	8	17	344



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: June Significant Activity

Philippines

In June, Philippines Armed Forces ramped up operations against ISIS-linked militants. On 12 JUN, the AFP launched airstrikes against a BIFF bomb-making factory and then raided the site. The raid resulted in multiple suspected militants, including possible foreign fighters, killed or wounded, and the AFP recovered an undetermined amount of IEDs. In response, the BIFF executed retaliatory actions against government troops. The AFP also launched operations to neutralize Abu Dar, who is now leading the remnants of the Maute Group. The government has offered a reward of USD 122,300 for his capture. **PNA (6/11/18) Inquirer (6/20/18) CNN Philippines (6/25/18)**

On 21 JUN, President Duterte decided to postpone the upcoming 28 JUN peace talks with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), the umbrella organization of Philippines communist groups, pending a three-month review of all signed agreements related to the negotiations. Following the announcement, the NDFP declared that they will give up talking with the president, and that they would rather join movements to oust him. NDFP advisor, Joma Sison, stated that it would be easier to prepare for peace negotiations with the administration that follows Duterte's. **Philippine Star (6/28/18) CNN Philippines (6/29/18)**

This month, President Duterte approved a US \$5.6 billion budget to modernize military facilities to ensure that the Philippines can defend its territories in the future. *Second Horizon* is the second phase of the "Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program," which is slated for implementation from 2018-2022 and is a transition period from internal security operations to territorial defense. This comes following reports of China's recent deployment of long-range bombers in the Paracel islands in the South China Sea. The Philippines will acquire defense items for its Army, Air Force, and Navy such as military vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment. **AA (6/21/18) The Diplomat (6/29/18)**

Burma

On 25 JUN, the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on seven senior Burmese military officers, all of whom hold the rank of general. One of these officers, Major General Maung Maung Soe, was responsible for the operation that drove approximately 700,000 Rohingya Muslims to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. Another officer, Thant Zin Oo, the commander of the Eighth Security Police Battalion, stands accused of serious human rights violations that include unlawful killings and the systematic burning of Rohingya houses and buildings. The sanctions froze the officers' assets and banned them from traveling to the EU. The EU also extended an arms embargo and prohibited any training or cooperation with Burmese armed forces. The Burmese government responded to the sanctions by removing Major General Maung Maung Soe from his position due to poor performance. Other generals have stepped down as well. The sanctions imposed by the EU represent just one example of shifting international relationships with the Burmese government in response to the Rohingya issue. **Daily Star (6/26/18) Daily Star (6/27/18)**

Thailand


On 11 JUN, the deputy chairman of the Islamic Committee of Pattani, Abduldej Chenae, and four others were killed by unknown attackers with small arms. Local officials suspect the victims were targeted in a revenge attack carried out by insurgents or by villagers over a personal dispute. Abduldej's death raised the issue of the personal safety of those involved in resolving the conflict in Southern Thailand. **UCA News (6/11/18) BenarNews (6/15/18)**

Indonesia

In mid-June, Indonesia's Social Affairs Minister pledged to protect and rehabilitate the seven children who became orphans when their parents killed themselves last month during terrorist attacks. The three boys and four girls, between the ages of four and 15, received medical and psychological treatment in Surabaya following their parents' deaths. In addition to providing them with protection and assistance, the Social Affairs Ministry wants to guide their development and "clean their minds completely from radical ideology." The ministry has so far provided care for 81 children tied to terrorism. **Benar News (6/13/18)**

In late June, a Jakarta court found Aman Abdurrahman, the leader of the VEO Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), guilty of inciting terrorism and sentenced him to death. Abdurrahman, an extremist Indonesian cleric, is responsible for five terror attacks, including the January 2016 attack in which a suicide bomber and a gunman killed four people and wounded 25 in central Jakarta. Abdurrahman's lawyer stated that he had met the cleric hours before the court proceedings began, and Abdurrahman had told him he would "praise God" if the court sentenced him to death. Abdurrahman had the right to appeal the verdict but, has chosen to forgo exercising that option. The court has not yet set the date of Abdurrahman's death by firing squad. **CNN (6/22/18) Jakarta Post (6/29/18)**

Philippines: June IED Events



There were seven IED detonation events, five IED found and cleared events, and nine IED cache events.

On 2 JUN, Army EOD found and cleared an IED along Maguindanao Highway, Saniag, Ampatuan, Maguindanao, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Mindanao. Civilians found the device and reported it to authorities. The device consisted of a 105-mm howitzer shell, wires, and a 9-volt battery as the trigger mechanism. **Inquirer Mindanao (6/3/18) PNA (6/4/18)**




On 16 JUN, security forces found and cleared an IED in Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao; residents alerted authorities of an unattended bag. The device incorporated a time fuse, a plastic container, duct tape, pieces of metal fragments with jagged edges, gray powder, and a detonator which could be activated from a distance. The military blamed the BIFF, stating that they are likely attempting to avenge the death of their comrades during recent military air and ground attacks. **PNA (6/16/18) Philippine Star (6/16/18) NDBC News (6/17/18)**

On 21 JUN, an IED emplaced by New People's Army (NPA) rebels, detonated against a military convoy in Binay, Magpet, Cotabato, SOCCSKSARGEN, Mindanao; six soldiers injured. Following the detonation, a small arms firefight ensued until the rebels fled. The NPA's Guerilla Front 53 has a presence in the area where they collect "protection money." **Manila Bulletin (6/22/18)**

This month, IED activity remained steady from the previous month, with about an equivalent number of events perpetrated by Islamic militants and the NPA. In the southern Philippines, the AFP took an aggressive stance toward ISIS-linked militants, including the BIFF and remnants of the Maute Group, in an attempt to further degrade their capabilities. The AFP is expecting Islamic militants to retaliate against the increased security presence and activity (**see SEA SIGACTs**), which could lead to an increase in activity over the next month.

The NPA have continued to attack security forces and civilians, and these attacks will likely continue until a formal peace process is in place. It remains unclear when talks will resume, as President Duterte postponed June negotiations once again (**see SEA SIGACTs**).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	7	6	0	11	24
	Year	85	465	0	285	835
Event Count	Month	7	5	0	9	21
	Year	78	40	0	113	231



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: June IED Events



There were four IED detonation events, one IED found and cleared event, and two IED cache events.

On 6 JUN, a roadside IED planted next to a power pole detonated near Ban Sa Kho School in Muang, Yala when an EOD unit arrived to inspect a suspicious object; one security forces member injured. **Phuket News (6/6/18) The Nation (6/6/18)**


On 21 JUN, police recovered an IED cache in an Isuzu pickup truck in Tak Bai, Narathiwat after the suspect abandoned the vehicle during a pursuit by police for not stopping at a security check point. Police detained the suspect. The cache contained 41 pipe bombs, two communication radios, four torches, two boxes of radio circuitry, 36 boxes containing timer circuits set for five minutes, another box of circuits set for 10 minutes, and two boxes set for 30 minutes. **Bangkok Post (6/21/18) Thai PBS (6/21/18)**

On 28 JUN, a 2kg VOIED detonated in a rubber plantation when the victim stepped on the device in Yaha, Yala; one civilian injured. **Bangkok Post (6/28/18)**


In June, IED activity decreased significantly over the previous month. Only four detonations occurred in June compared to 14 detonations in May. Most notable this month, was the discovery of a large IED cache on 21 JUN, which is likely the largest cache of assembled IEDs recovered in the south in several years. Based on the number of devices found and their uniform construction, the IEDs appear to be mass produced. Authorities stated that the devices were similar to those in recent attacks in the Deep South. Since the PVC material used in the construction of the devices is not available in country, local police suspect that bomb-makers likely assembled the devices in Malaysia and then smuggled them into Thailand. The Sungai Golok River is the natural border between Thailand and Malaysia and is widely known for illegal activities such as smuggling. Thai authorities believe the cache may have been intended for post-Ramadan attacks. Following the event, security checkpoints have increased security measures and officials have warned that attackers may potentially conceal their faces with motorcycle helmets or even dress as Muslim women with headscarves.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	4	1	0	41	46
	Year	89	25	2	58	174
Event Count	Month	4	1	0	2	7
	Year	73	17	2	12	104


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Indonesia: June IED Events



There were two IED cache events.

On 2 JUN, Densus 88 recovered an IED cache after arresting three suspected JAD militants at Riau University, Sumatra. The cache contained two pipe-bombs, TATP and other explosive precursors (KN03, sulfur, sugar, and charcoal), two bows, eight arrows, a shotgun, a grenade, an ISIS video, and books about bombmaking and self-defense techniques. The three militants were reportedly plotting to conduct an attack on local lawmakers in the provincial capital of Pekanbaru. **Straits Times (6/4/18) Netral News (6/3/18) Tempo (6/4/18) Tempo (6/13/18) Kompas (6/2/18)**


On 22 JUN, Densus 88 recovered an IED cache after killing a suspected JAD militant in Pamanukan, West Java. The cache contained a single IED that the suspect was carrying in a backpack. Densus 88 officers were surveilling the militant after he left his home in Indramayu, West Java. At some point near an overpass in Pamanukan, police attempted to arrest the JAD militant. The militant reportedly resisted and lunged at the officers with a knife. In response, police shot and killed the militant. **Jakarta Post (6/23/18) Detik News (6/22/18)**

IED activity in Indonesia fell considerably this month, after an unusual spike in activity in May related to the Surabaya bombings. Indonesian security forces focused their efforts on neutralizing the Surabaya militant cells, which as of mid-July have yielded 110 arrests, and for providing security for post-Ramadan celebrations and regional elections. Except for a few districts in Papua that experienced some minor skirmishes between separatist groups and government security forces, the elections were free of violence.


The 2 JUN incident at Riau University is an example of a concerning trend of extremism penetrating Indonesian institutions of higher education. In recent years, both government and non-government agencies have expressed apprehension about the spread of radicalism in Indonesian universities. An April 2018 report from Indonesia's state intelligence agency (BIN), noted that the agency found 40% of students at some of the top universities have been exposed to radical views. Although all three suspects were Riau alumni and not current students, they maintained ties to the university through social clubs.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	3	3
	Year	13	8	2	243	266
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	2	2
	Year	9	3	2	16	30

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Vietnam: June IED Events




There was one IED detonation event.

On 20 JUN, an IED detonated in front of a police station in Ho Chi Minh City, wounding a policewoman and destroying several motorbikes. CCTV footage revealed that two unidentified men travelling on a motorcycle, momentarily stopped in front of the police station to throw an object in its direction. Soon after the men passed, an explosion occurred. **Tuoi Tre News (6/21/18) DTI News (6/21/18)**


Bombings in Vietnam are rare events. Although police have yet to comment on a possible motive for the 20 JUN bombing, it is possible that the attack relates to recent large-scale protests. From 9 to 11 JUN, protesters held rare demonstrations in Ho Chi Minh City and several other cities across Vietnam. The protests were sparked by fears that a government proposal to setup special economic zones and grant investors lengthy land leases would extend Chinese influence in Vietnam, a country where anti-Chinese sentiment runs high. Ho Chi Minh City saw some of the largest demonstrations and as thousands of protesters converged on the streets, police reportedly arrested hundreds and assaulted dozens. Because of the protests, Hanoi has chosen to postpone a decision on the land-lease law until October.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	1	0	9	0	10
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	1	0	3	1	5

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: June Significant Activity

China – Technology

In June 2018, media reported that Chinese scientists have developed robotic bird drones that mimic real doves in both flight characteristics and appearance. The report alleges that government agencies and the military are using the new “spy birds” program, code-named *Dove*, to spy on parts of the Chinese population, in particular the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The *Dove* project leader is more circumspect, stating the program's purposes are for environmental protection, land planning, and border patrol.



The bird drones operate with a low-noise, flapping wing mechanism, and are a step forward in developing biologically inspired drones that can evade radar and human recognition. In addition to their life-like appearance, the drones are equipped with a high-definition camera, a GPS antenna, flight controls, a data link with satellite communication ability, and a mechanism that counters any jerky movements to ensure sharp images and footage. Although the development is still in its early stages, the drones can fool the most sensitive radar systems. This, in combination with camouflage (such as real feathers), has prompted radar scientists to search for new detection methods.

Scientists in the Netherlands, Germany, and the US are working on their own robotic birds, but so far, none has come close to the Chinese doves. According to Gan Xiaohua, Chief Engineer at the People's Liberation Army Air Force Equipment Research Institute in Beijing, the doves are currently the only bionic micro-drones capable of independently carrying out a mission. Despite their technological advances, the doves are still far from being perfect. Their inability to fly long distances or maintain course in strong winds, and their vulnerability to electromagnetic disturbances leaves room for improvement. However, once developers overcome these challenges are, the doves will be difficult to detect. **South China Morning Post (28 JUN 2018)**


China – Counterterrorism

On 16 JUN, the Chinese Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP), the Supreme People's Court (SPC), the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice issued new guidance for judges and prosecutors regarding China's laws on terrorism and what defines terrorist support activities. The new guidelines stipulate that those persons who participate in activities such as producing, transporting, storing and purchasing explosives and other hazardous material for terrorist attacks will be convicted. Additionally, organizing training either in-person or online, making contact with terrorist groups, publishing, compiling, or distributing materials with terrorist ideologies or other extremist content are offenses that could result in convictions for advocating terrorism. This new guidance further links terrorism with religious extremism and allows sweeping authority to prosecute for perceived extremist views. **Foreign Affairs (16 JUN 2018) Savetibet.org (26 JUN 2018)**

China – Regional Cooperation

On 10 JUN, Chinese President Xi Jinping chaired a restricted session at the 18th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao, China. Since 1997, when Russian President Yeltsin and Chinese President Zemin signed a declaration to promote a multipolar world, the SCO has expanded its original writ well beyond border security cooperation. It currently brokers discussions in global governance and diplomacy, education and technology, and seeks to foster cooperation in economic development and sustainability with eight Asian member nations, four observer nations, and six dialogue partners. As China passed rotational presidency on to Kyrgyzstan at this summit, President Xi called on members to remain true to the original SCO aspiration, while also proposing to “Advance the Shanghai Spirit...upgrade security cooperation and effectively crack down upon the ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, extremism, and separatism.” The proposals Xi made at the summit depict a desire to embolden and energize the SCO and according to Xi, “to complement the development strategies” of the Chinese Belt Road Initiative in areas of economic security that reach beyond collective regional security cooperation. With the addition of India and Pakistan in 2017, the SCO now represents 50 percent of the global population and more than 20 percent of global GDP. **27c.net (6/11/18) Al Arabiya (6/29/18) China Daily (6/28/18)**

China: June IED Events




There was one IED detonation event.

On 18 JUN, a PBIED detonated on a crowded commercial bus in Leshan, Sichuan, injuring 15 civilians and the perpetrator. Leshan City police responded and apprehended one civilian, a 31 year-old male named Gu, who was known to local police as a drug addict and a thief. The explosive material used was powerful enough to blow out all the windows on one side of the bus. CCTV showed there was some indication of an impending detonation as the bus suddenly pulled over to the wrong side of the street and people began disembarking seconds before the blast. Police ruled out terrorism as a motive, given Gu's known background, and are conducting an investigation. **South China Morning Post (6/19/18)**
Shanghaiist (6/18/18)


This is the first IED event reported in China since June 2017, during which a disgruntled individual attacked a kindergarten with a PBIED. The June 2018 event was also a PBIED, and followed the usual pattern of events in China in which a disgruntled individual carries out an attack in a public location. Although explosions (usually related to industrial disasters) do occur quite frequently, IED detonations are not the norm. Likewise, knife attacks and other types of violence targeting civilians occur more commonly, as opposed to IED attacks. The 18 JUN attack was likely an isolated event and does not indicate the start of increased violence.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	2	0	1	0	3
Event Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	2	0	1	1	4

Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

9 JUN (BUR): Anniversary of Ceasefire of KIA

9-15 JUN (IND): Jan Pituri Week

14 JUN (WW): Ramadan Ends

13 JUL (INDO): Anniversary of Marriot-Ritz bombing

28 JUL - 3 AUG (IND): Martyr's Weeks

8 AUG 1988 (BUR): 8888 Uprising

14 AUG 1947 (IND): Naga Independence Day

15 AUG 1949 (IND): Independence Day

23 AUG 2003 (IND): Mumbai Attack - Gateway of India

IND – India
INDO – Indonesia
BUR – Burma
WW – Worldwide

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
June 2018	27	28	29	30	31	1	2
	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW	7 WW	8 WW	9 IND BUR WW
	10 IND WW	11 IND WW	12 IND WW	13 IND WW	14 IND WW	15 IND	16
	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
July 2018	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	8	9	10	11	12	13 INDO	14
	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
	22	23	24	25	26	27	28 IND
August 2018	29 IND	30 IND	31 IND	1 IND	2 IND	3 IND	4
	5	6	7	8 BUR	9	10	11
	12	13	14 IND	15 IND	16	17	18
	19	20	21	22	23 IND	24	25
	26	27	28	29	30	31	1

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate
 ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil
 ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
 CIV – Civilian
 CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
 COIN – Counter-insurgency
 CWIED – Command Wire IED
 DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency
 EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile
 EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 F/C – Found & Cleared
 HME – Homemade Explosives
 HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)
 IDF – Indirect Fire
 IDP – Internally Displaced Persons
 IED – Improvised Explosive Device
 KFR – Kidnap for Ransom
 KIA – Killed in Action
 LOC – Line of Communication
 LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas
 MSR – Main Supply Routes
 NFI – No Further Information
 NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report
 PBA – Post Blast Analysis
 PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED

PCB – Printed Circuit Board
 PN – Partner Nation
 PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
 QRF – Quick Response Force
 RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
 RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
 RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
 SA – South Asia
 SAF – Small Arms Fire
 SEA – Southeast Asia
 SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
 TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
 TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C₇H₅N₃O₆)
 TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
 UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
 VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
 VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
 VOIED – Victim Operated IED
 WIA – Wounded in Action

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group
 BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
 BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani
 BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate
 BSF – Border Security Forces
 BNP – Bangladesh National Party
 BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)
 CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)
 CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
 CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
 CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)
 GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani
 HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
 HNLC – Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (India)
 HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh
 IB – India's Intelligence Bureau
 IM – Indian Mujahideen
 IrW – Irregular Warfare
 ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
 ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham
 JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid
 JI – Jemaah Islamiya
 JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
 JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
 JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed

JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
 JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
 KIA – Kachin Independence Army
 KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
 KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
 LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
 MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
 MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
 MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
 NPA – New People's Army
 PNP – Philippine National Police
 POLRI – Indonesian National Police
 PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
 RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
 RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
 SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
 SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
 ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
 UWSA – United Wa State Army
 YCL – Youth Communist League